

ENGAGING FUTURE FAILING STATES

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ENGAGING FUTURE FAILING STATES

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ABSTRACT

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The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States identified the global security threat posed by failing states. The USG response for these threats in the past has vacillated between diplomacy and military intervention, with less than optimum results. Recognition of the need for a Whole-of-Government response led to the formation of the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability to “promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” The organizations and processes implemented since 2005 provide a more integrated United States Government approach, but are primarily focused on crisis response to existing conflicts. There is a need for a strategy to identify future failing states and provide contingency planning and anticipatory assistance. Challenges to this approach include: lack of common definitions; lack of real-time predictive analytics; and organizational cultural barriers to contingency planning. Utilizing a holistic approach may provide the opportunity to anticipate and mitigate challenges of future failing states before crisis occurs.

ENGAGING FUTURE FAILING STATES

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path towards peaceful societies, democracies and market economies.

—President Barack Obama¹

The United States faces a future filled with Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) problems on a global scale.² On the international scene, the United States and allies are engaged in current military missions in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, Asia, and South America. There is an increasing proliferation of failed and failing states, historic adversaries and rogue states are developing nuclear capabilities, and non-state actors are threatening world security and stability. The 2010 Department of State (DOS) Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) recognized that “failing states create safe havens for terrorists, insurgencies, and criminal syndicates.”³ With over half of the 177 countries recognized by the United Nations classified as weak, failing, or failed states, traditional national security solutions are being challenged.⁴

The United States Government (USG) response for many of these threats in the past seemed to vacillate between diplomacy on the one hand, and military intervention on the other, with less than optimum results—in many cases due to the uncoordinated efforts of the Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD).⁵ There has been growing recognition in government sectors that what is needed to successfully face future VUCA problems is a Whole-of-Government (WoG)⁶ strategy and approach, but

recent attempts to execute such approaches have provided neither the integrated efforts envisioned nor the desired results.⁷

This paper will investigate challenges in the current system of identifying and responding to potential future failing states, highlight possible opportunities, and make recommendations to improve the current efforts in this vital endeavor. It will discuss the elements of national power and how they are used, underscore the differences between WoG and Comprehensive approaches to national strategy, and provide recommendations for improvements to current efforts to engage the VUCA problems caused by failing states.

Challenges of Failing States

Over the last ten years, the United States and its allies have been concentrating their attention and resources on nation-states in crisis such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and Haiti, while little attention has been paid to future failing states—relatively stable nation-states that are in danger of becoming failed states but have not yet crossed the crisis threshold into failed state status. In recognizing this threat, President Barack Obama issued National Security Presidential Directive Forty Four (NSPD 44) to direct USG efforts to stabilize countries at risk of civil strife.⁸

While the bulk of national resources committed to failed states has been the military arm of national power for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT), there has been recurring calls for efforts to head off problems before they occur as insurgents have become adept at moving their operations into failing nation-states where there is less chance of government interference with their global operations.

But the ability to provide international support for failing nation-states is hampered by the absence of well-defined terminology, methodologies for determining

nations in danger of becoming failing states, unity of command and effort, and a proven process for accomplishing successful preemptive interventions. The following sections will discuss each of these challenges in detail.

Defining Failing States. As previously stated, there is no single definition for what constitutes a failing state.⁹ Each agency or organization has its own definitions and terminology, but these definitions are not generally accepted and have not proven their efficacy. Although the National Security Strategy recognized that “failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security,” it does not define the term.¹⁰ NSPD-44, as previously stated, sets the policy that the USG will assist in stabilizing countries at risk of civil strife, but does not define them as failing states.¹¹ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism used the term failing states, indicating states incapable of ensuring national sovereignty, but does not define the term.¹² The National Intelligence Council (NIC) defined failing and failed states as those “with expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective governmental control.”¹³

DOS used the term fragile states as those “unable to provide physical security and basic services for their citizens due to lack of control over physical territory, massive corruption, criminal capture of government institutions, feudal gaps between rich and poor, an absence of social responsibility by elites, or simply grinding poverty and the absence of any tradition of functioning government.”¹⁴ USAID defined fragile states as including failed, failing, and recovering states.¹⁵ The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) defined failing states as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security.”¹⁶

The National Defense Strategy does not mention failing states, but declared that “the inability of many states to police themselves effectively or work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international community.”¹⁷ The National Military Strategy also does not mention failing states, but recognized that “adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks,” and discusses stability operations.¹⁸ The Department of Defense instruction on stability operations does not mention failing states, but set stability operations as a core mission for the U.S. military and directed the implementation “across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.”¹⁹ U.S. Joint Doctrine does not list the term failing states in official joint terminology.²⁰

The most complete definition of failing states is contained in the U.S. Army Doctrine manual FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*. The FM 3-07 model uses the term fragile states to describe a framework with a spectrum from violent conflict through normalization including failed, failing, and recovering conditions.²¹ A fragile state is defined as “a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government.”²² The model further breaks the spectrum down by crisis and vulnerable states. A crisis state is defined as “a nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory,” while a vulnerable state is defined as “a nation unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population.”²³ While this model does not provide a definitive definition, it described a failing state as one in which “the legitimacy of the central government is in question.”²⁴

This lack of common definitions and terminology among the myriad of government agencies involved in identifying and responding to the issue of failing states limits their ability to collaborate on integrated solutions.²⁵ It also highlights the organizational cultural differences between the DOD, DOS, USAID, Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DOC), Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security (DHS) departments. The ability of the agencies to act in an integrated effort to resolve the issues associated with failing states is limited due, in part, to these cultural differences. Although DOS has been assigned as the lead agency in coordinating WoG efforts, senior interagency officials have voiced concerns and demonstrated limited support.²⁶

Identifying Failing States. Another challenge in the case of future failing states is that there are no generally accepted methodologies for determining states that fall into this category. There are several popular indices that rank nation-states according to objective and subjective criteria, but most are lagging indicators that are not intended to be predictive. The most popularly referenced indices include: the Fund for Peace Failed State Index; the Brookings Institute Index of State Weakness; the George Mason University State Fragility Index; the World Bank At Risk States Index; the U.S. Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework; the U.S. Institute of Peace Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework; and the National Intelligence Council Internal Stability Watchlist. The following paragraphs will discuss several of these indices and their applicability for determining future failing states.

The Fund for Peace Failed State Index (FSI) rates nation-state stability based on twelve indicators in the social, economic, and political categories.²⁷ The Fund for Peace is an independent organization whose stated mission is to “promote sustainable security

through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers.”²⁸ While generally useful for relative ranking and past trending, the index is not intended to be predictive.

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) index is a metrics framework for measuring outcome-based goals in Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations.²⁹ The intent of MPICE is to provide “a system of metrics that can assist in formulating policy and implementing strategic and operational plans to transform conflict and bring stability to war-torn societies.”³⁰ The framework provides a quantifiable measure to determine trends in ongoing R&S operations over time, but caution must be used in that the measures may be influenced by scope, stage, state, and locality of the operation.³¹ MPICE does not use real-time information and is not intended to be a predictive model.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) Internal Stability Watchlist (ISW) is a “robust system for identifying countries that are vulnerable to state failure,”³² derived from a variety of classified and unclassified sources. The State Department Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Office of Conflict Prevention uses the ISW in its global Early Warning Monitoring Program to provide early warning, conflict assessment, mitigation planning, and conflict prevention. The Office of Conflict Prevention uses the ISW data, along with other sources, to prioritize countries and regions requiring assistance.

But with all the national resources involved in the collection, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence, development of an accurate, effective, or timely predictive

capability in the case of future failing states has eluded the USG. As recently voiced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “we are not good at predicting the future” when it comes to national security issues.³³ In cases where the intelligence community accurately predicts impending situations, such as the case of the recent fall of the Egyptian government,³⁴ the processes in place for implementing a WoG response to future failing states is slow to recognize and respond to impending dangers.

Unity of Command. One generally accepted key to success in large multi-organizational projects and military operations is unity of command—having a single chain of command responsible for the planning and execution of all phases of an operation. The strategic level chain of command for dealing with failing states is defined in the *Congressional Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008*.³⁵ The R&S legislation authorizes the President to furnish assistance to future failing states, if it is deemed to be in the national interests.³⁶ The legislation also established the Office of S/CRS within DOS.³⁷ The position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) was created, to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The Coordinator is envisioned to be the single point of contact for all matters relating to WoG global stability and reconstruction efforts.

The operational chain of command, as defined in the legislation, has the Coordinator reporting directly to the Secretary of State for all matters relating to stabilization and reconstruction. The S/CRS office is tasked with monitoring, assessing, planning, coordinating, training, and maintaining capacity to respond to reconstruction and stabilization crises. The Director for Conflict Prevention reports directly to the Coordinator and is responsible for: coordinating interagency processes to identify states

at risk of instability; leading WoG and Comprehensive efforts in conflict planning, prevention, and mitigation; and developing tools for integrated efforts in conflict prevention.

The tactical level chain of command is also defined in the legislation with the formation of Response Readiness Corps (RRC).³⁸ The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Administrator of USAID and other agencies of the federal government can establish an RRC and a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) to deploy in response to crises. Deployed forces are placed under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission (COM) in the affected country. Once the implementation phase is reached, the COM of the country involved is responsible for executing the approved strategy and monitoring progress towards stated goals. The COM acts as the Chief Executive Officer for interagency missions and is empowered and held accountable for WoG integration at the tactical level.³⁹

But in actual operation, unity of command in R&S operations is, at best, a significant challenge. This is due, in part, to 1) the complexity of interagency and international cooperation, 2) cultural, organizational, procedural, and capacity differences between USG civilian agencies and the military and 3) lack of resources and authority by S/CRS and other USG agencies.⁴⁰ In his recent book, Donald Rumsfeld discussed the R&S efforts in Iraq and stated: “the muddled lines of authority meant there was no single individual in control or responsible ... There were far too many hands on the wheel, which, in my view, was a formula for running the truck into the ditch.”⁴¹ A 2007 GAO report found “guidance on roles and responsibilities for State’s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent.”⁴² Despite significant steps taken by

DOS in response to these criticisms, Unity of command continues to be a significant challenge when dealing with large interagency efforts.

*Unity of Effort.*⁴³ Unity of effort is critical to achieving success in operations requiring multiple elements of national power.⁴⁴ Unity of effort is defined as “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.”⁴⁵ In order to have unity of effort, it is essential to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the various activities of the myriad of actors including USG, international partners, host nation, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and corporate entities to affect a desired outcome.

In reality, although there has been much effort to implement R&S frameworks, unity of effort has not yet been achieved across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of government. At the strategic and operational levels, some USG interagency partners have voiced concerns about the cumbersome planning process, and resource constraints for operations that are not part of their core missions or current budgets.⁴⁶ Although the challenges at the tactical level are more confined and should be easier to coordinate due to the unity of command provided by the Chief of Mission in each country, there are still gaps in providing unity of effort due to unclear guidance, roles, and authorities for the multitude of USG entities conducting field operations.⁴⁷

Current R&S Process. The general principles and current R&S process were approved by the NSC in 2008.⁴⁸ In the framework, planning for conflict transformation is divided into crisis response planning and long-term contingency response planning. As the name indicates, crisis planning can occur whenever a global crisis occurs and is ad hoc in nature as circumstances dictate. Deliberate long-term scenario-based planning is

intended to provide contingency planning and recommendations for preventative actions that should be incorporated into agency strategic planning.⁴⁹

The established R&S planning cycle includes the phases: situation analysis, policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation planning.⁵⁰ This process is intended to be iterative and flexible as the environment or situational awareness evolves, and has an integrated monitoring function to provide necessary feedback, identify new challenges, and highlight windows of opportunity. The strategic planning team includes all relevant USG agencies, Combatant Command representatives, the State Regional Assistant (SRA), and the COM to ensure a WoG approach to identified issues.

Guidance for triggering the R&S process was approved by the NSC in 2007.⁵¹ The guidance delineates the difference between long-term scenario based planning for conflict prevention and crises response planning. Long-term planning is triggered via a request from the COM or Regional Assistant Secretary (RAS) to the R&S Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). The proposal is reviewed based on established criteria including: importance, magnitude, potential for U.S. involvement, likelihood, and capacity.⁵² The PCC holds a semi-annual planning guidance meeting to prioritize WoG missions based on the NIC ISW and COM proposals. The PCC forwards recommendations to the NSC Deputies Committee (DC) or Principles Committee (PC) for approval.

Once the WoG response is approved, an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) analysis is implemented to “develop a commonly held understanding, across relevant USG Departments and Agencies of the dynamics driving

and mitigating violent conflict within a country, that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions.”⁵³ The ICAF was created by an interagency working group that included representatives of the S/CRS office, USAID, OSD, JFCOM, and the Army’s Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and has been used in conflict prevention, contingency planning, and crisis response planning in multiple countries.⁵⁴ The steps of the ICAF include: evaluate context; understand grievances; identify drivers of conflict; and describing opportunities for decreasing conflict.⁵⁵ The output of the ICAF assessment is fed into the USG planning process at the relevant departments, agencies, embassies, and Combatant Commanders.

While much progress has been made in creating a process to ensure unity of effort in WoG responses to failing states, the process is still maturing and has numerous critics. Challenges include: an organizational cultural shift from diplomacy to a production paradigm at DOS;⁵⁶ whether DOS has sufficient authority and resources to execute the process;⁵⁷ the R&S process is untested and may be infeasible;⁵⁸ and USG interagency concerns about the cumbersome planning process and resource constraints.⁵⁹ There is also an organizational bias towards crisis management, with lesser efforts in contingency planning and conflict prevention.

Strategies for Engaging Future Failing States

Once a future failing state has been recognized, the next challenges include determining a strategy for responding to the issues identified. A strategy should include how an entity uses its power to affect desired changes.⁶⁰ The U.S. Army War College model of strategy development includes identifying the ends (objectives), means (resources), and ways (courses of action) available to affect a desired change.⁶¹ In the case of national strategy, this includes identifying the elements of national of power than

can be brought to bear (means), and the approaches to applying these elements (ways), in order to affect the desired end of helping future failing states in moving towards stability (ends). The following sections will describe the elements of national power, discuss the current approaches to applying those elements, provide a Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability (FAS) analysis of each approach in dealing with future failing states, and also provide a risk analysis.⁶²

Means of Engaging Future Failing States. The means of a strategy define the resources available to meet the desired ends.⁶³ The elements of national power are the resources available for use in dealing with future failing states.⁶⁴ National power is the ability of a nation-state to influence global events.⁶⁵ *Joint Publication 1-02* defines the elements of national power as the means available to be utilized in meeting national objectives.⁶⁶ The recognized elements of national power have evolved over time as the global environment emerged from the medieval period into the periods of statism, mercantilism, industrialism, the information age, and now into the knowledge age.

In response to the changing global environment, several models of national power have emerged over time. The Joint Doctrine Model identifies the elements of national power as “diplomatic, economic, informational, and military.”⁶⁷ The U.S. Army War College Model recognizes Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) as the prime elements, but also sometimes, arguably, includes Financial, Intelligence, and Legal (DIMEFIL).⁶⁸ According to DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):

America’s enduring effort to advance common interests without resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability.⁶⁹

The National Security Strategy model includes Defense, Diplomacy, Development, Economic, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Strategic Communication, and the American People and Private Sector.⁷⁰ What each of these models highlights is the growing list of possible elements of national power available for dealing with future failing states and other VUCA problems of the twenty first century.

Ways of Engaging Future Failing States. The ways of a strategy are used to explain how the organization will execute the plan in order to meet the desired ends.⁷¹ There are numerous ways of strategically combining the elements of national power to meet the stated end of successfully engaging future failing states. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. professed that “converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership.”⁷² National power resources can be combined and utilized in different ways to deter, coerce, induce, influence, co-opt, and attract others to perform in ways to reach the desired ends. Using an analogy of playing poker, the elements of national power are like the player’s cards; having a winning hand does not always guaranty a win, whereas skillful playing increases the likelihood of winning.⁷³ The following paragraphs discuss Smart Power and Twenty-First Century Statecraft approaches to utilizing the elements of national power in engaging future failing states, and provides a FAS analysis of each.

Smart Power⁷⁴ is the skillful utilization of the elements of national power to attract when possible using Soft Power,⁷⁵ and to coerce when necessary using Hard Power⁷⁶—the proverbial carrot and stick approach—is useful when dealing with failing nation-states.⁷⁷ Smart Power utilizes an integrated WOG strategy by maintaining a strong and relevant military, and investing heavily in diplomacy and development aid.⁷⁸ The key to a

Smart Power WoG approach is having the authority to marshal the collaborative efforts of multiple USG departments and agencies to provide the required unity of effort.

The WoG effort in dealing with future failing states is led by S/CRS, and requires participation by numerous USG departments and agencies including: DOS, DOD, USAID, DHS, USDA, DOT, DOJ, DOE, HHS, and DOC.

The utilization of smart power is feasible in engaging future failing states because the USG is already invested in WOG efforts, but in an uncoordinated fashion. The resources required include the development of a Grand National Strategy and the alignment of WoG efforts to meet those strategic objectives. Smart power is acceptable in that the American people and allies expect the USG to function with a high level of integration and sophistication. Smart power is suitable for dealing with nation-states, but has not proved effective in dealing with power diffusion⁷⁹ issues such as the rise of dark networks.⁸⁰

The risks associated with smart power include the cost of global engagement with the possibility of strategic overreach while trying to be everything to everyone. There is the risk of assuming that Smart Power will replace hard power or soft power, but it is dependent on credible hard power for relevancy and soft power for attraction in nation-state relations.

Twenty-First Century Statecraft⁸¹ is a comprehensive approach⁸² utilizing smart power when dealing diplomatically with nation-states, while harnessing the power of diffusion—which is the power of individuals and networks in a global knowledge market due to the wide-spread distribution of technology—when dealing with dark networks.⁸³ The 2010 DOS QDDR defines Twenty-First Century Statecraft as the connection of

“private and civic sectors with our foreign policy work by bringing new resources and partners to the table; better using connection technologies and expanding, facilitating, and streamlining our public-private partnership process.”⁸⁴

The Twenty-First Century Statecraft approach for dealing with future failing states is also led by S/CRS and requires coordination with numerous international organizations including: foreign governments and the UN; regional partners including NATO, EU, AU, UAS, etc.; civic organizations and NGOs; hyper-empowered individuals; and international corporations. The key to the Twenty-First Century Statecraft is to have the global influence to marshal the cooperative efforts of the multitude of organizations to provide the required unity of effort.

Twenty-First Century Statecraft will become more feasible in dealing with future failing states as other approaches become less effective, but may take years to build national capacity to leverage knowledge age processes, technologies, and collaborative connections required at the strategic level of government. Twenty-First Century Statecraft is acceptable in that it allows for continuation of current smart power efforts while reducing future budgetary requirements due to more reliance on global collaborative efforts. The suitability of Twenty-First Century Statecraft will be determined once implemented.

There is little risk associated with executing Twenty-First Century Statecraft because it involves adapting to global trends that will naturally evolve. There is the need to balance national and global interests, for instance how much should the United States defer to international organizations. Another risk is the conflict between international law and the constitutionally-derived U.S. statutes. There are also segments

of the American population that do not embrace globalization, and will not support any efforts that reduce the ability of the United States to act unilaterally in pursuit of U.S. interests. Large scale comprehensive efforts require time to develop, which may preclude their use in near-term crises. There is also the risk of assuming that Twenty-First Century Statecraft will replace smart power, but it is dependent on smart power to provide continued nation-state relations.

Analysis and Recommendations

In light of the above discussions, the following recommendations should be considered.

First and foremost, the lack of a well-defined and universally accepted terminology for describing future failing states hampers the ability of USG departments, agencies, international allies, and NGOs to effectively collaborate in responding to the threat of failing nation-states. Without a shared vocabulary, the ability to objectively describe the phenomenon, develop effective strategies, and discuss lessons learned becomes more difficult. It also hampers international efforts by restricting the ability to design holistic conflict prevention strategies, establish norms, and develop procedures that can be objectively measured for effectiveness.⁸⁵

This paper recommends development of overarching governance documents for USG R&S definitions, terminology, and concepts. This should be similar in scope and content to the Joint Publications series provided to the military forces. USG departments, agencies, and institutes would be required to change their current documentation to match the governance specified definitions and terminology.

Second, the lack of real-time, highly-accurate, predictive analytics hampers the ability of the USG to quickly and reliably identify nation-states in danger of becoming

failing states. This is evident by looking at each of the indices and noting that none accurately predicted current events in the middle-east. Recent media reports indicate that although \$125 million has been spent by the USG on predictive analytic models over the last three years, there was little success in providing early warning of current political unrest.⁸⁶ Without some form of early warning, the ability to provide useful contingency planning is hampered.

This paper recommends development of highly accurate real-time predictive analytics models. Although this has been a USG goal for many years, this project should be given a higher priority. Recommend issuing an industry challenge similar to the DARPA Urban Challenge for autonomous vehicles, analogous to the industry practice of crowd-sourcing which has provided unexpected dividends in the research world. The focus should be on providing foresight for anticipatory contingency planning in a range of possible scenarios for development of pre-planned responses.⁸⁷

Third, there is a bias towards crisis management over contingency planning for future failing states. While the S/CRS office is tasked to monitor “political and economic stability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the reconstruction and stabilization of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or are in transition from conflict or civil strife,”⁸⁸ their efforts have been heavily focused on current crises due to resource constraints. Although a relatively new organization, contingency planning has not matured to the point of providing proven beneficial results. There are cultural barriers in DOS to conducting contingency planning; the triggering mechanism for planning is ad hoc and personality dependent; and there are no metrics that reliably measure the impact of actions taken.

This paper recommends increased focus on contingency planning including development of pre-planned strategic communications for immediately responding to evolving situations. Today's fast-paced media cycle has created a time-gap between when events occur and crisis action planning can provide a comprehensive USG response. Although crisis action planning includes a strategic communications plan, it is often time-late and ineffective.

Fourth, organizational issues within DOS hamper the ability to effectively produce comprehensive responses to future failing states.⁸⁹ The challenges of unity of command hamper the ability to provide unity of effort. There is a power distance of multiple layers of bureaucracy between the strategic level, operational levels, and tactical levels of the chain of command. Roles and responsibilities are in flux as DOS reorganizes to better support the QDDR. While the reorganization may raise the visibility of R&S in the internal DOS organization, it will also add another layer of bureaucracy to the power distance. Adding additional layers of bureaucracy may decrease organizational agility in responding to future failing states.

This paper recommends conducting a WoG organizational efficiency review to flatten the R&S organization and reduce bureaucratic overhead. The organization seems to function well at the operational level of command; the review should focus on the strategic and tactical levels, where many documented challenges remain. Although Congress provided funding for resourcing the DOS organization, the review should focus on budgetary authorities to affect change in associated WoG departments and agencies. This review should also streamline the R&S planning process utilizing Lean Six Sigma (LSS) techniques to reduce transactional costs and increase process

efficiencies. The USG cannot effectively plan for all contingencies with the limited resources available, requiring some type of automated prioritization of the states predicted to fail based on U.S. vital interests, and these processes should automatically trigger scenario planning.

The big organizational question that should be answered, though, is whether the strategic level functions of R&S belongs in DOS at all. It would be difficult to drive WoG processes from inside any agency, and other reports have purported that DOS lacks the “necessary clout to drive policy formulation or the technical expertise to manage implementation processes, especially on issues where bureaucratic equities overlap.”⁹⁰ The professional at S/CRS have successfully implemented several WoG responses at the operational level of command, but these processes are personality driven, do not have appropriate budgetary authority, and do not always have the required high level support from interagency partners.⁹¹

This paper recommends restructuring at the National Security Council to provide strategic oversight of the myriad of departments and agencies required for a true WoG level of effort in dealing with future failing states. Prior studies have recommended this in the past,⁹² but believe the success of the current DOS efforts have precluded a serious examination of this recommendation. As highlighted in other research, S/CRS efforts should be continued and expanded to provide operational level leadership, planning, collaboration, and coordination.⁹³ But an overarching and integrated governance structure should be implemented to ensure alignment of National Security Strategy, WoG tasking, and USG Departmental and Agency resourcing.

Fifth, the R&S community needs to integrate more diverse skills and perspectives from a wide variety of communities. The current S/CRS organization includes personnel recruited from inside the USG Civil Service. While this hiring practice has the advantage of quickly building an experienced core for a new organization, it also has several disadvantages. People recruited from inside an organization, generally, have a cultural bias towards parent organizations; demonstrated skills that promoted them in the past, may not be the requisite skills needed for the future; and they are generally closer to retirement, making knowledge retention in the organization problematic.

This paper recommends implementing a Talent Management strategy to recruit, train, and retain the best and brightest into R&S organizations. Utilizing Talent Management techniques, determine the required Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) for R&S planning and established strategies to either train or recruit required specialist. Required specialization should include senior level strategic planners, conflict prevention specialists, cultural anthropologists, program and project managers, knowledge managers, corporate and NGO liaisons, and ex-military campaign planners and PRT Commanders. These specialists should be teamed with existing DOS, USAID, and DOD counterparts in a reverse mentoring program for cross-cultural training.

Lastly, R&S organizations, processes, literature, and proposed remedies are based on the Westphalian view of diplomacy with bilateral relations between stable nation-states. While this strategy has worked well to provide global stability since WWII, it remains to be seen whether it is sufficient to deal with evolving threats such as trans-national dark networks and future failing nation-states where tribal governance is the

norm. In the twenty first century, many nation-state boundaries created by colonialism are not recognized by the indigenous tribal groups, trans-national corporations and dark networks work across global boundaries to gain economic and political power, and hyper-empowered individuals are unbounded by Westphalian constraints.⁹⁴ In these instances, the strategy of trying to build government stability via bilateral agreements may be problematic.

This paper recommends using a holistic approach⁹⁵ for dealing with the twenty first century VUCA problems. Rather than trying to solve all problems simultaneously using WoG or Comprehensive approaches in a limited resource environment, determine the key relationship that could provide the tipping point between stability and chaos, and concentrate efforts on that variable.⁹⁶ An example of this theory in practice was presented by Eric Barlow at the TEDGlobal 2010 conference.⁹⁷ In his analysis of COIN operations in Afghanistan, Barlow used a complexity diagram to highlight the key nodes as “engagement with ethnic rivalries and religious beliefs” and “fair transparent economic development”.⁹⁸ Using the holistic approach, concentration of efforts in these key areas could flip the failing state status of a nation-state.

Conclusion

As the United States prepares to face the VUCA problems of the twenty first century, the ability to accurately predict and prepare to face the challenges of future failing states is imperative. Although the USG has attempted to integrate the appropriate elements of national power utilizing WoG and Comprehensive approaches to increase global stability, the efficacy of these approaches have, as yet, remained unrealized. The growing global issues of economic disparity, overpopulation, food security, health services availability, migration pressures, environmental degradation, personal and

community issues, and diffusion of political power requires a new look at how the USG and partners provide for that global stability.⁹⁹

Recognizing the need for transformation, DOS produced the first QDDR in 2010 which identifies fundamental changes in management approach to better provide unity of command and unity of effort.¹⁰⁰ It calls for increased Talent Management by prioritizing interagency experience in recruitment, and increased training for Chiefs of Mission. It also calls for increased empowerment for Chiefs of Mission to act as Chief Executive Officers (Unity of command) and be held accountable for results.¹⁰¹ These changes, as well as others highlighted in the QDDR, will build on the progress already being made in the USG ability to aggressively respond to future failing states.

But there is a growing need for a proven strategy to identify future failing states and provide contingency planning and anticipatory assistance before crisis occurs. As stated in the QDDR: “by deploying integrated teams of experienced mediators, negotiators, and early-responders that draw not only from State but also USAID, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Government can help to prevent armed conflict from breaking out and reduce the likelihood that the United States or other forces will be required.”¹⁰²

The challenges to this approach including lack of common definitions, lack of real-time predictive analytics, and organizational cultural barriers to contingency planning, need to be overcome in order to realize success in this vital endeavor. Utilization of the recommendations presented in this paper, including a holistic approach and Twenty-First Century elements of national power, may provide the opportunity to

diminish the threat of future failing states before crisis occurs, and allow the USG to successfully manage the VUCA challenges of the twenty first century.

Endnotes

¹ President Barack Obama, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, (Washington, DC: National Security Council, December 7, 2005), 1.

² National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, November 2008), 3.

³ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), xii.

⁴ National Strategy Information Center, *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda*, (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2010), 1.

⁵ Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, February 2010), 1.

⁶ FM 3-07 defines a WoG approach as “an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” A successful WoG approach is very challenging because of the differing civilian organizational cultures and biases involved. A WoG approach requires that all participants: are represented and actively involved in the process; have a shared understanding of the desired ends; and collaboratively share resources and capabilities to achieve those ends.

⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2007), 3.

⁸ President Barack Obama, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 1.

⁹ Congressional Research Services, *Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, August 28, 2008), 4.

¹⁰ President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 8.

¹¹ President Barack Obama, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 1.

¹² National Security Council, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: National Security Council, September 2006), 16.

¹³ National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*, (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, December 2004), 14.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 120-121.

¹⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development, *Fragile States Strategy*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2005), 1.

¹⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Forces that will Shape America's Future*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 11, 2007), 5.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2008), 2.

¹⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 5.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Instruction 3000.05*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009), 2.

²⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," *Joint Publication 1-02* (Washington, DC: JCS, May 30, 2008).

²¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 1-10.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2007), 3.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The social indicators include: demographic pressures; refugees and displaced persons movement; group grievances; chronic human flight; and uneven development. The economic indicators include: economic output; and legitimacy of the state. The political indicators include: public services; human rights; security; factionalization; and external influences.

²⁸ *The Fund for Peace Home Page*, <http://www.fundforpeace.org> (accessed December 12, 2010).

²⁹ John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds., *Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2010), x.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., xvii.

³² *U.S. Department of State Home Page*, <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/66425.htm> (accessed January 30, 2011).

³³ ADM Mike Mullen, "Officership and the Profession" lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 10, 2011, for attribution.

³⁴ Kimberly Dozier, "Top US Spy Gives Intelligence Agencies B+ on Egypt", *Associated Press*, (February 10, 2011).

³⁵ *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008*, Public Law 110-417, 110th Congress, (October 14, 2008), sec. 618.

³⁶ If the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States for United States civilian agencies or non-federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is of risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife, the President may, in accordance provisions set forth in section 614(a)(3), subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection but notwithstanding any other provision of the law, and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, furnish assistance to such country or region for reconstruction or stabilization using funds under paragraph (3).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, sec. 618(a)(2).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, sec. 62(b).

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, vi.

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2007), 4.

⁴¹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, (New York, NY: Sentinel, February 8, 2011), 780.

⁴² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, 6.

⁴³ The *Guiding Principles of the U.S. Institute of Peace* defines unity of effort as the outcome of coordination and cooperation among all actors, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures. This applies to efforts among agencies of the U.S. government, between the U.S. government and the international community, and between the host nation government and the international community. Unity of effort is an important crosscutting principle because the U.S. government will always find itself to be just one player among numerous local and international actors.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07, 1-3.

⁴⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", *Joint Publication 1-02*, 387.

⁴⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, 4.

⁴⁷ Sharon Morris, James Stephenson, COL Paul Ciminelli, Donald Muncy, Tod Wilson, and Al Nugent, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, (Washington, DC: Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, April 5, 2006), 11.

⁴⁸ National Security Council Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee, *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, (Washington, DC: Reconstruction Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee, May 15, 2008), 1-8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ National Security Council Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee, *Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, (Washington, DC: Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee, January 25, 2007), 1-4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁵³ U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework Handbook*, (Washington, DC: Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2010), 2.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Addressing Threats Posed by Fragile States: SCRS and the Civilian Response Corps,” briefing slides, Washington, DC, February 2011.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁶ Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 5, 2009), 2.

⁵⁷ Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation*, (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Securities Studies Program, June, 2008), 89.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, 4.

⁶⁰ Alan G. Stolberg, "Making National Policy in the 21st Century," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Vol. II (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2010), 29.

⁶¹ H. Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Vol. I, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2010), 49.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 50.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁶⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), 3.

⁶⁵ Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007), 6.

⁶⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," *Joint Publication 1-02*, 178.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ R. Craig Nation, "National Power," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Vol. I, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2010), 143.

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), v.

⁷⁰ President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 14-16.

⁷¹ H. Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, Vol. I, 49.

⁷² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Smart power consists of investing in efforts that promote the global good by providing products and services that people and governments in all quarters of the world want, but cannot attain without U.S. Leadership. In her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained: "We must use what has been called 'smart power,' the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. Smart power includes the skillful combination of hard and soft power to achieve U.S. objectives, but also providing leadership in specific global areas of interest such as human rights, climate change, and energy policy. Providing for the global good helps blend U.S. national interests with global interests, with the intended end of re-establishing U.S. legitimacy in solving global problems. There have been several proposals, notably from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, to move to a smart power construct in order to regain U.S. global leadership. The ways in which smart power is executed include:

rebuilding alliances, partnerships, and institutions that are the foundations for dealing with global challenges; increasing global development to decrease inequities between nations and regions; improving public diplomacy by increasing access to information, knowledge, and learning; Increasing economic integration and free trade with and for all; and increasing innovation and the use of technology to help solve global problems such as climate change and energy insecurity. The means of achieving smart power is to develop an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to effectively utilize hard and soft power. To do this, the United States must maintain a strong and relevant military, invest heavily in diplomacy and aid, but also increase participation in international alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels.

⁷⁵ Soft power is the ability to exert national power through co-option and the promotion of the legitimacy of U.S. policies. Joseph S. Nye states “soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.” The intended ends of soft power are to engender cooperation by convincing allies and adversaries of the justness of U.S. interests, values, culture, policies, and institutions. The ways to execute soft power include utilizing diplomacy and strategic communications to sell the U.S. “brand”, and providing foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development aid to promote the common good. The means of soft power includes: leading by example and attracting others to do what you want; promoting intangible assets such as ethical behavior; and promoting policies that are seen as having moral authority. The utilization of the elements of national power to attract is helpful when dealing with emerging democracies and future failing states. Although theoretically feasible, the use of soft power has not demonstrated the ability to meet the intended ends as world opinion about the United States has turned more negative since implementation. The concept of soft power is acceptable to the United States and international public, since it relies on ethical values and behaviors. While skeptics claim that popularity should not guide foreign policy, soft power has not been shown to be suitable in changing some attitudes about U.S. foreign policy, and has few measurable successes. The risks associated with soft power include the need to retain the ability to act unilaterally in support of U.S. national interests—no matter what world opinion says. Soft power is also of little use in dealing with ideologues such as dictators, insurgents, and terrorists, in that they will never be convinced of the righteousness of U.S. policies. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, and Soft Power critic stated: “Dialog and cooperation with repressive governments is too often an excuse for doing nothing about Human Rights.” In some cultures, reliance on soft power is a sign of weakness, which can lead to severe unintended consequences. Over-reliance on soft power alone can also lead to the mistaken belief that hard power is no longer necessary or valid.

⁷⁶ Hard power is the ability to exert national power through coercive means and has been a mainstay of U.S. national security since the mid-twentieth century. According to Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.” The elements of hard power include: building and maintaining a large and capable military in all domains including air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace for coercion, deterrence, and protection; the use of coercive diplomacy; and the reliance on economic aid and sanctions to influence allies and adversaries. Hard power methods include using DIMEFIL to influence the behavior or interests of other nations or states through threats, rewards, or a combination of the two. Hard power means can be used to defeat, coerce, deter, dissuade, or compel adversaries, and to reassure allies. The utilization of the instruments of national power to coerce, compel, reassure, deter, dissuade, or defeat is necessary when dealing with despots, insurgencies, and mass atrocities. But the feasibility of maintaining a large standing military and providing massive foreign aid will be challenged in the near future with the requirement for U.S. deficit reduction. Hard power has been acceptable to the USG and public since the end of the

cold war, but faces growing dissatisfaction in global circles, especially when dealing with future failing states. The suitability of hard power has been demonstrated in achieving military objectives, but has not demonstrated consistent adequacy in meeting long-term political objectives. There are numerous risks associated with the use of hard power. Although in appropriate circumstances—such as foreign aggression—the use of credible and effective hard power is required, the over-reliance on these solutions leads to a reduction in overall national power as world opinion turns negative to U.S. actions. The maintenance of an overwhelming military capability and providing diplomacy and foreign aid is resource intensive and can drain assets from other national priorities such as domestic programs. The apparent and measurable success of hard power can lead to mission creep, where non-military functions are incrementally assigned to the military, reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of appropriate military missions.

⁷⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”, *Foreign Affairs*, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2009).

⁷⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hillary Rodham Clinton Confirmation Hearings*, January 13, 2009.

⁷⁹ Power Diffusion is the shifting of global power from governments and nation-states to non-state actors such as dark networks, global corporations, rogue actors, and hyper-empowered individuals due to wide-spread distribution of technology.

⁸⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Global Power Shifts,” TED Talks, http://www.ted.com/talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html, (accessed March 16, 2011).

⁸¹ The Twenty-First Century Statecraft approach is based on opportunities for continued U.S. global leadership in the emerging century. Twenty-First Century Statecraft ends are realized through a reliance on smart power to deal with the current global power transition and traditional nation-state issues, but also leverages the power of diffusion to deal with global problems. The ways of achieving Twenty-First Century Statecraft include: creating a national talent management effort to attract and retain the world’s best and brightest; becoming a center of organizational transformation to increase agility, innovation, and experimentation; maintaining the global commons for DIMEFIL; becoming the network connectivity crossroads of the world; collaborating by, with, and through allies and host nations for dealing with dark networks; and becoming the trusted agent in global diplomatic, information, economic, and financial markets. The means of achieving Twenty-First Century Statecraft will require an integrated comprehensive USG effort, reorganization on the national strategic level to support twenty first century concepts, and building national leadership focused on a strategic view rather than just current issues and crisis management. It will require building national capacity to leverage the knowledge age processes, technologies, and networks for the common good, while learning to defeat the dark networks and rogue actors through collaborative global efforts.

⁸² FM 3-07 defines the Comprehensive approach as: “an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” Comprehensive Approaches are extremely challenging because of the differing organizational cultures and biases inherent in working with foreign governments, international organizations, transnational super-empowered individuals, and NGOs. It requires that all participants: are accommodated; have a shared understanding of the situation; are

purpose driven toward common goals; and cooperatively share in the community of practice in order to provide support.

⁸³ In the 2010 QDDR cover letter, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton explained: “We will also pursue new ways of doing business that will help us bring together like-minded people and nations to solve the pressing problems we all face. We will reform and update international institutions, and we will use 21st century statecraft to extend the reach of our diplomacy beyond the halls of government office buildings.”

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, viii.

⁸⁵ Marc Grossman, “Diplomacy Before and After Conflict,” *Prism*, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, September, 2010), 4.

⁸⁶ Noah Shachtman, “Pentagon’s Prediction Software Didn’t Spot Egyptian Unrest,” *WIRED Blog*, February 11, 2011, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/pentagon-predict-egypt-unrest>, (accessed February 12, 2011).

⁸⁷ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, (Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform, November 2008), vi.

⁸⁸ United States Congress, State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (Amended 2008), (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 2008) sec. 62(a)(3)(A).

⁸⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, 4.

⁹⁰ James A. Schear and Leslie B. Curtin, “Complex Operations: Recalibrating the State Department’s Role,” *Complex Operations II Newsletter*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for Complex Operations, Nov 10), 36.

⁹¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, 4.

⁹² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, vii.

⁹³ James J. Love, COL, *A Whole of Government Approach to Stability Operations and Counterinsurgencies*, Strategy Research Paper, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 27, 2010), 17.

⁹⁴ Joel Kotkin, “The New World Order: Tribal Ties—Race, Ethnicity, and Religion—Are Becoming More Important than Borders,” *Newsweek Magazine*, (New York, NY: Newsweek, October 4, 2010), 44.

⁹⁵ A Holistic Approach is appropriate when dealing with complex adaptive social systems where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Complex adaptive systems consist of a large number of agents that interact with each other in unpredictable ways. Unlike linear systems—where cause and effect can be determined—complex adaptive systems are

exemplified by multivariate interrelationships where small changes in one variable may have unpredictably large impacts on the outcome of the system.

⁹⁶ Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity*, 2nd ed. (Burlington, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, 2006), 324.

⁹⁷ Eric Berlow, "How Complexity Leads to Simplicity", TED Talks, http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/eric_berlow_how_complexity_leads_to_simplicity.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, (New York: NY, United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 17.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., vi.

¹⁰² Ibid., 4.

